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ABSTRACT
The Croatian long-lasting fisheries problem still vivid one year after the Croatian admission to the EU 
is overfishing in a “common pool resource”. After the questionable success of previous policies, the 
new EU Integrated Maritime Policy devolves some of the mechanisms of the Common Fisheries Policy 
to the member states. This gives Croatia the opportunity to set policies that reflect its own interests: 
to rebuild its fish stocks, its fishing fleet and the supporting fish processing, services, and shipbuilding 
industries. This may be achieved without direct command and control governmental intervention 
used in the past. The institutionalisation of fishing rights in the general form of Transferable Fishing 
Concessions and in particular as it is known in the EU: Individual Transferable Quotas, creates a new 
asset, with benefits to entrepreneurs and entire industries. They may be used as a collateral for fishers 
during the investment cycle, a source of information, an incentive for monitoring of competitors, and a 
source of windfall profits. Therefore, we argue that Transferable Fishing Concessions could enable the 
internalisation of negative externalities across Croatian Adriatic fisheries.
1. Introduction
The European Union Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
is an example of policies with questionable success at EU 
level with the goal to control the allocation of a maritime 
domain commons by command and control mechanisms 
intervening directly into the production process with het-
erodox policies. As a consequence of this failure, and possi-
bly having learned something from the immense scientific 
contributions to the field of common pool resources’ man-
agement, the European Union decided to repeal and 
amend all major directives and decisions concerning the 
CFP and combining it with the Common Maritime Policy 
(CMP) consisting of the so called “Blue Growth” (mari-
time and coastal tourism, ocean renewable energy, marine 
mineral resources, aquaculture, and blue biotechnology), 
maritime transport, and shipbuilding, into an Integrated 
Maritime Policy (IMP) [3][4]. EU proposes the use of mar-
ket allocation mechanisms to conserve fish stocks within 
sustainable levels. In a system of Transferable Fishing 
Concessions (TFCs) the fisher has an obligation to hand 
out the amount of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) 
Figure 1 Individual transferable quotas within the system of transferable fishing concessions
Source: own representation.
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corresponding to the quantity of landed species. The total 
amount of ITQs for the respective species is called Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) and represents an estimate of an 
undisclosed sustainable yield measure setting the upper 
limit to the quantity of species that can be landed from a 
particular catchment area.
2. The institutinal setting at EU level
Since the EU has not explicitly defined TACs, or for 
that purpose, what measure of sustainability it is pursu-
ing, it is impossible to a priori assess the success of the 
proposed policy tools. Some known measures of sustain-
ability are: 1. Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is the 
highest catch from a stock under existing environmental 
conditions without affecting significantly the reproduc-
tion process [13], Carrying Capacity (C) is the population 
level to which a logistic population growth model converg-
es [1], Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) [13], Maximum 
Economic Performance (MEP) [10], Optimum Yield (OY) 
– the amount of fish harvested that: (a) provides the great-
est present value of benefits to the national economy, (b) 
maximises the sustainable yield from the fishery and (c) 
in the case of overfishing, provides for the rebuilding of 
stocks to MSY levels [10].
The MSY has been scientifically discredited since it ig-
nores the dependence of catches on fish stocks, and their 
maximum carrying capacity, and leads to a lower sustain-
able equilibria [1]. 
One of the sustainability definitions in fisheries refers 
to its capacity to meet the needs of the present genera-
tion, without hindering future generations from being able 
to meet their needs or causing trophic cascades or in any 
other way endangering the food web of the ecosystem. 
This highly enlightened definition is actually a platitude 
since no single person in its right mind can be against 
sustainability (however it may be defined) without dis-
crediting itself. So, the concept of sustainability leaves us 
without a clear goal function. 
The new European Common Fishery Policy (CFP) is 
integrated into the new European Integrated Maritime 
Policy (IMP) [6]. A new maritime domain management 
model is devolved to member states according to the 
principle of subsidiarity, but its basic principles, never-
theless, remain common to all member states. The new 
CFP moves towards markets that are deemed to be suc-
cessful in achieving the set goals of the preservation of 
scarce resources by simultaneously successfully equalis-
ing the marginal costs of the preservation of the resource 
and transmitting that information through the price sys-
tem. After the success of the much criticised greenhouse 
gas emission abatement programme called European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the EU is 
moving towards markets in other areas of environmen-
tal regulation. Aside from sustainability goals, the new 
CFP should also increase the productivity of the fisheries 
sector, stabilise markets, and ensure the availability of 
food supplies at reasonable prices. To achieve these goals 
the member states shall, in their respective Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ), introduce a system of Individual 
Transferable Quotas (ITQs) that would achieve sustain-
ability and efficiency by equalising marginal costs of en-
vironmental protection for an assessed sustainable fish 
stock at least cost. The new CFP permits member states 
to set differential policies for territorial waters and the 
EEZ [4]. A rational policy could maximise the benefits 
for Croatian fisheries, its supporting industries, local 
communities, taxpayers, other stakeholders, and the 
environment.
To be able to implement the full set of economic incen-
tives proposed by the new CFP, Croatia needs to assert its 
sovereignty over the natural resources it claims. Firstly, 
this means the proclamation of its contiguous zone to be 
able to effectively prosecute illegal fishers escaping ter-
ritorial waters. Without the proclamation of the contigu-
ous zone, Croatia loses its right to prosecute illegal fishing 
in its territorial waters if the trespasser has already left 
the territorial waters [15]. Without legal power to effec-
tively implement its economic legislation, Croatia cannot 
achieve the goals stated by the new CFP. The rule of law 
firstly starts with the national sovereignty and the inclu-
sive application of the written legislation. Only the legis-
lation that is effectively applied has the power of law and 
may induce compliance. Secondly, it includes the procla-
mation of the exclusive economic zone, where the intro-
duction of the Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), as a 
cornerstone of the new CFP, may be fully implemented [4]. 
Croatia, as a member of the EU needs to pay special atten-
tion not to discriminate against other member countries’ 
and their citizens’ rights (especially Italy and Slovenia). 
The new CFP, nevertheless, enables member states to 
discriminate against other member states’ fishers on the 
grounds of boat origin, but only in territorial waters [4]. 
In order to be able to fish in Croatian territorial waters, 
the boat has to be registered as a Croatian fishing vessel. 
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) remains an area of 
competitive fishing between EU vessels and prone to dev-
astation. The enforcement of rules in the new, according 
to the principle of subsidiarity, devolved CFP stays with 
the member states, with community level oversight. The 
system is a complicated multilevel regulation with hetero-
dox rules and goals. Although one of the goals of the new 
CFP is to increase fishing efficiency, the technical meas-
ures to preserve fish stocks increase the fishing effort and 
unavoidably reduce fishing efficiency. The previous CFP’s 
centralised, top-down approach to maritime domain man-
agement is in the new CFP replaced by the member states’ 
flexibility to adopt one or many of the other available 
tools. The new CFP sets overall goals, but the implementa-
tion is left to EU member states. The primary goals are to 
reduce catches within maximum sustainable yield levels, 
to implement an “ecosystem-based approach” to fishing, 
to reduce fleet overcapacity through market measures, 
and to develop alternative management models. It is up to 
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the ability of individual member states to rationally adopt 
policies that would maximise the benefits from resource 
use at least cost having in mind the environmental target 
as a given one. This is basically a cost effectiveness analy-
sis. Croatian institutions and organisations are well suited 
to assess fish stocks, sustainable yields, reproductive areas 
and reproduction times. Beside the governmental organi-
sations that are manned to do the administrative work, 
Croatia has three scientific institutions specialised in ocea-
nography and marine biology: Institute of Oceanography 
and Fisheries in Split, Institute Ruđer Bošković – Centre 
for Marine Research in Rovinj, and the Institute for Marine 
and Coastal Research of the University of Dubrovnik. 
They are more than capable of assessing and forecasting 
Croatian fish stocks. It is their assessment that is ultimate-
ly going to be presented to the EU Commission for approv-
al since it is the only scientifically backed data.
3. Croatian fisheries
Croatia has about 7,800 fishing vessels. Some 3,500 
are registered for commercial purposes. More than 80% 
of all fishing vessels are not categorized as fishing ships 
since they measure less than 12 meters and are less than 
15 tonnes of weight. The installed power of the fleet in the 
year 2011 was 327,000 KW and the total draught 45,000 
gross tonnes. During the same year the commercial fishing 
fleet of 226 vessels reported a total catchment of 64,389 
tonnes of pelagic fish. The Croatian fisheries market is or-
ganised into cooperatives, buy-off stations and registered 
first buyers. Captures may be marketed for the first time 
exclusively in accordance with the standards regulating 
presentation, preservation, freshness and size. Market 
organisation differentiates demersal and pelagic fisher-
ies. High-quality demersal fish is mostly retail sold or ex-
ported after the first sale. Small pelagic species such as 
sardines and anchovy (over 80% of the total catchment) 
are mostly processed or sold as feed to tuna farms. Almost 
90% of the catch is realized by purse seines. Towed gear 
accounts for some 8%, and gillnets and trammel nets for 
around 1% of the total catch. All other gear accounts for 
less than 1% of the total catch. Fish accounts for 96% of 
the total catch [16].
The latest EU regulation should improve the CFP by 
adapting exploitation rates so as to ensure that, within a 
reasonable time-frame, the exploitation of marine biologi-
cal resources restores and maintains populations of har-
vested stocks above levels that can produce a maximum 
sustainable yield [3]. Since Croatia has more than 1,000 
small-scale coastal fishing vessels, it shall adopt an action 
plan for the development, competitiveness and sustain-
ability of small-scale coastal fishing. Together with the 
preservation of the exclusive fishing rights in the Croatian 
territorial waters for Croatian fishers (a ban for all other 
fishers from the EU and the third countries), the action 
plan should introduce a constant quantification of the bi-
omass for the purpose of yearly assessments of variable 
TACs. Croatia has a detailed system of fishery regulations 
based on years of negotiations between fishers, govern-
ment, scientists, NGO’s, and other stakeholders. Although 
Croatia has already introduced TACs and daily allowable 
catches for specific species (tuna), these quotas are not 
recognized as assets, and are not tradable. Without trad-
ing, banking, lending and borrowing ITQ’s, sustainable 
fishing efficiency is greatly diminished. Without the pos-
sibility of time-space-scope ITQ arbitrage and speculation, 
fishers cannot optimize on catches, fishing effort, fishing 
costs and other parameters. The problem of discards and 
by-catches is then also harder to solve. Although discards 
are now fully banned, they cannot in reality be stopped. 
The lack of trading ITQ’s makes the problem only greater. 
The present Croatian system of direct regulation includes 
the entire spectrum of measures: catchment period re-
strictions during recruitment months, catchment loca-
tion restrictions with the protection of major assessed 
recruitment locations, regulation of catchment quotas 
(total weight), catchment size (minimal length) and catch-
ing fishing effort by regulating fishing tools’ technical 
characteristics.
The consequence of Croatian long-lasting overfish-
ing problem can be illustrated through a well known 
sintagma “tragedy of the commons” [8], that in a com-
mon pool of renewable resources, without an effective 
control over the catching, the fishers tend to overhar-
vest the stock of fish to the point of its irreversible de-
pletion. Marine biologists and economists have different 
perspectives of the underlying problem of the tragedy of 
the commons in fisheries. Marine biologists tend to view 
the problem from the exclusive perspective of protect-
ing the fish and other endangered sea creatures from 
overharvesting by directly tackling fishing technologies. 
Economists are aware that it is an incentive problem and 
shun direct intervention into production technologies 
that make fishing harder, but ultimately do not eliminate 
overharvesting, since the fishers compensate it by in-
creasing their fishing effort. The economists’ perspective 
is to influence behaviour by creating a set of allocation 
and monitoring rules. By regulating fishing technolo-
gies, the regulator directly influences economic benefits 
from the fisheries, mostly having a negative impact on ef-
ficiency by simultaneously not promoting effectiveness. 
By allocating TAC (Total Allowable Catch) through ITQs 
(Individual Transferable Quotas), the regulator does not 
disrupt the economic process of competition between 
different production techniques, i.e. different production 
functions. This knowledge is specific in Hayekian sense 
and is unknown to the regulator [9]. A comprehensive 
management system of fisheries should acknowledge the 
specificities of different sciences and relate to them the 
important decisions from their respective fields of study. 
When the regulator makes decisions about minimal 
standards for the protection of marine species, allowed 
harvesting techniques or allowed fishing areas and times, 
it directly influences fishing effort [13].
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4. Alternative allocation mechanisms
There is an ongoing debate about economics acknowl-
edge of two broad groups of allocation mechanisms: al-
location by compulsion, and allocation by free market 
cooperation. Environmental economic policy instruments 
may also be divided into three broad groups. Essentially, 
some authors argue for a dual division on prescriptive 
regulation consisting of various subtypes of command 
and control regulation versus market-based instruments 
manipulating economic incentives by controlling either 
prices or quantities. These perspectives are based on op-
posing dualities – public authority versus market based 
solutions. But there is also a third solution – self-govern-
ance mechanisms founded on stakeholders inclusion into 
the decision process. This approach has a prominent role 
in contemporary efforts to find better solutions to the 
problem of excessive and uncontrolled use of commons 
[12] and uncontrolled and irrational use of the maritime 
domain [2]. Both command and control, as well as market-
based solutions, require rules and umpires. The first may 
consist of allocation rules of fishing times and fishing ar-
eas (lottery, regular rotation, homesteading rules, etc.) or 
command and control regulation prescribing fishing tech-
niques such as gear regulations, minimum mesh sizes for 
nets, closed areas and seasons, minimum landing sizes, 
and by-catch limits as a percentage of the total catch. The 
most direct intervention into the production function in-
cludes limiting the fishing effort by controlling the fleet 
capacity measured in installed engine power and drought, 
and by limiting time spent at sea [7]. Market-based instru-
ments manage economic incentives by controlling either 
prices or quantities and the decision on technology is 
left to the entrepreneur [10]. With command and control 
environmental policy instruments, control resides with 
the regulator who may not be up to date with the latest 
technologies, or who might favour certain types of tech-
nologies based on political circumstances. Prescriptive 
regulation is still an integral part of every regulation of 
fisheries, and will probably stay for a foreseeable future, 
at least as a standard of the best practice. With regard to 
the choice between market-based environmental policy 
instruments, there is a lot of debate between the propo-
nents of price and the proponents of quantity regulation. 
Weitzman [18] shows that, in the case of fisheries, with 
recurrent ecological uncertainty, as in highly variable re-
cruitments, and without regard to other uncertainties and 
risks, a price regulation in the form of an optimal land-
ing fee is always superior to a quota system. The problem 
with the optimal landing fee is that, besides the need for 
a constant monitoring and calculation of TACs, it also ne-
cessitates a regulator that would constantly optimize the 
landing fee to the TAC. Without the ability of constant in-
tervention into the landing fee, price regulation is unable 
to precisely control and prevent overfishing in a situation 
of already low recruitment [18]. The former problem of 
monitoring may easily be solved by using modern surveil-
lance devices as in the case of the UK’s Remote Electronic 
Monitoring [14]. In the case of the latter problem of over-
fishing, only a constant trial and error management sys-
tem may bring maximal sustainable yields. Harvest quotas 
in the form of TACs also have their own advantages and 
drawbacks. When TACs are defined, and if timespan be-
tween catchment and landing can efficiently be controlled 
against discards, the total quantity of fish being caught can 
be capped. The major problem with quotas, according to 
Weitzman, is their inability to control for fishing effort in 
times of low recruitment and opposing expectations from 
fishers [18]. Fishing effort is a measure of entrepreneurial 
activity. It is the problem for the individual fisher as an en-
trepreneur to solve his optimization problem, as he is the 
sole ultimate bearer of his own entrepreneurial decisions 
and risks. The proper role of the regulator is to give the 
fishery industry all possible information about estimated 
biomass, individual species’ recruitments, growth rates, 
previous season’s escapements, previous seasons’ harvest 
quantities, estimated total sustainable yields, at the lowest 
possible cost. The landing fee and the ITQs unfortunately 
have a common problem: they exacerbate the problem of 
discards. The quantity of the catchment with the assessed 
value below the fee will be discarded in the case of land-
ing fees, and the catchment for which no ITQs may be 
provided at lower cost than their assessed market value 
shall also be discarded. The difference between taxes and 
quotas is that input values for the discards in the case of 
taxes are a priori known, whereas, in the case of quotas, 
additional quotas must be bought. But, a fisherman only 
needs to call his broker and buy quotas depending on that 
day’s catching. Experience has shown that market-based 
instruments are more environmentally effective, economi-
cally more efficient, and practically easier to administer 
than command-and-control regulation [3]. Command-and-
control regulation in Croatia was unable to stop the halv-
ing of fish stocks during the period of some 50 years. Of 
the two proposed market-based instruments, uncertainty 
in the variables clearly favours quantity instruments [17].
5. Catchings or landings: the problem of discards
The problem of discards is one of the great problems of 
fishery that was observed in the North Sea fisheries after 
the introduction of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). 
The problem appears when the portfolio of fisherman’s 
ITQs does not correspond to the catchment, whereby the 
non corresponding catchment is discarded before landing. 
This problem will probably never be completely solved, 
as long as fishers have an economic incentive to discard. 
Even a complete prohibition of discards with penalties 
cannot stop the discards until the perceived benefits of 
discards are larger than the costs of the discards adjusted 
for the risks of being caught. So, it is an economic external-
ity. Discards have never been an acute problem in Croatia 
as the fisheries in Croatia are more readily identified and 
almost all catchments have some economic value and are 
duly landed. The problem of discards might appear if ITQ’s 
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are not implemented correctly, or if the market functional-
ity and liquidity of the ITQ market is inhibited. One of the 
proposals to deal with the problem of by-catch discards 
are by-catch ITQs. If kept under permissible boundaries, 
by-catch ITQs might be an adequate solution to the prob-
lem of discards. Nevertheless, the problem of discards per-
sists as long as the market value of the marginal by-catch 
is lower than the cost of the by-catch ITQ. Regarding the 
technical ways of solving the problem of discards, the dis-
cards of resistant species shall be allowed under the condi-
tions of expedient processing. Fish that are discarded alive 
and survive, technically do not represent any discard. To 
solve this problem one must try to optimize the portfolio 
of ITQs ex-ante and equalize it ex-post with the catchment. 
One of the possible ways to do that is by permitting the 
ITQ market to function freely, including full forward and 
backward arbitrage and speculation by enabling it to form 
its own forward market including partial banking of at 
least several months, overlapping ITQ durations, constant 
ITQ supply, lending, and short selling. In doing so, the mar-
ket would gain the necessary level of liquidity with addi-
tional benefit of more frequent market valuation. Another 
possibility to gain liquidity is by increasing the divisibil-
ity of ITQ’s: by decreasing their standard unit of measure 
from 1 metric tonne to say 100 kg or less. The fisheries in 
the Adriatic Sea are, in comparison to the North Sea, rela-
tively small. In some years the lack of sardines is compen-
sated by the abundance of anchovies and vice versa. So, 
the third possible market incentive to deal with by-catch 
discards deals directly with interspecies recruitment risks 
and their correlation. But, if the recruitment correlation 
of sardines and anchovies is less than one, a number of 
interspecies pelagic (sardines and anchovies) ITQs may 
be issued, or alternatively, a conversion between the two 
may be permitted according to a predetermined ratio. The 
relative share of such ITQs would be small, not to endan-
ger any particular species, or worse, to destabilise the ex-
change rate between different species’ ITQ’s. The fourth 
possible solution to the problem of total species and inter-
species recruitment variability are informational benefits 
from the forward ITQ markets for the regulator. The ITQ 
market constantly bets on the forecasts of future recruit-
ments. The governmental fisheries institutes may play an 
important role in the reduction of informational asym-
metries where possible. For this purpose, the results of 
monitoring activities such as MEDIAS, MEDITS, Deep Sea 
Survey, UWTV Survey, and other should be made public as 
soon as possible [16].
6. Total allowable catch allocation
The usual approach to harvesting strategies had long 
suggested the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), i.e. the 
maximum value of the growth curve as an optimal strate-
gy. This approach has been refuted since it ignores the de-
pendence of harvest on the population size, it ignores the 
economic motivation of the harvesters as it may achieve 
an equilibrium MSY in an outright low population size di-
minishing the possible long run returns, and it ultimate-
ly leads to a fragile situation for fishery survival [1]. The 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) shall thus take into considera-
tion the achievable population sizes in form of maximum 
carrying capacities of species in an ecosystem. These are at 
least known from the historical data, and they show that in 
the case of the Adriatic Sea, the fish stocks have decreased 
over 50% and settled on a new much lower MSY stability 
point [16]. The fish stocks in the now Croatian Protected 
Ecological and Fishery Zone have been almost totally de-
pleted [16]. This might be the principal reason for a lack of 
interest in the EEZ by the Croatian politics. As fish stocks 
in the EEZ are depleted, Croatian fishers abandon the EEZ 
as a common pool resource and the fish from the EEZ loses 
its greatest advocate: a political vicious cycle.
The Maritime Domain Management Model consists 
of optimizing the TAC quantity by stabilising the market 
clearing ITQ price at a level where social marginal benefits 
and costs of catchment would exactly be equal, with mini-
mal costs of catchment and minimal costs of necessary fu-
 
ITQ 
price 
Catchment 
quantity 
Total Allowable Catch 
Market 
clearing 
ITQ price 
Marginal 
social cost of 
catchment 
Marginal social 
bene�it of 
catchment Total 
stock 
Figure 2 Equalisation of marginal costs and benefits under the transferable fishing concessions model 
Source: Own representation
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ture recruitment protection. Since the marginal costs and 
benefits as well as the measures of marginal fishing effort 
are unknown to the regulator, but some measures of sus-
tainability may be decided upon, the regulation of quan-
tity has informational advantages over the regulation of 
price. TACs need to be administratively set. The Adaptive 
Maritime Domain Management Model is based on the 
notion that social management models are evolutionary 
structures that need active participation from all stake-
holders [3].
The success of the model is based on its ability to adapt 
to changing circumstances, and to deliver the expected re-
sults: full alignment of fisher’s incentives with social and 
ecological goals together with full cost allocation (inter-
nalisation of externalities). Whether the TAC is set within 
the process of political log-rolling or administratively or 
scientifically set, is not without merit. As the example of 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme certificate pricing has 
demonstrated, the political acceptability and economic 
success of common pool resource management by “priva-
tisation” is determined by the possibility of the system to 
produce long-run stable prices as an informational basis 
for entrepreneurial decision making. The economic sys-
tem is an information sharing system, where human ac-
tion is bounded by encoded or embedded rules, and where 
effort and investment flows to the largest returns. An ITQ 
system may produce, as the EU ETS has shown, well in 
advance known quantities, stable prices, and enough in-
centives that would induce a new cycle of investment into 
the new modern fishing equipment with multiplier conse-
quences for the economy. ITQs are assets in the EU nor-
mally recognized by banks and investors as collateral ones 
for investments into fishing ships and fishing gear.
7. Conclusion
Marine biologists and economists have different per-
spectives of the underlying problem of the tragedy of the 
commons in fisheries. The Common Fisheries Policies 
failed to achieve any measure of “sustainability”. Scarce 
maritime domain resources require management and al-
location rules. Fisheries may achieve sustainable maxi-
mum carrying capacities, environmental effectiveness 
and economic efficiency provided that the incentives are 
transmitted as optimally priced, clearly defined, divisible 
and defendable property rights. Property rights are insti-
tutions that have been proven in the EU greenhouse gas 
mitigating programme. Transferable Fishing Concessions 
(TFCs) in the form of Individual Transferable Quotas 
(ITQs) is an allocation system of scarce resources based 
on market transfer of scarce and sparse information about 
marginal benefits of fishing, marginal costs of fishing, mar-
ginal costs of preservation of sustainable fishing stocks, 
and resulting marginal fishing effort. It is a system of in-
centives. The system has to be flexible enough to permit 
its own evolution by modifying its key financial (banking, 
lending, borrowing, shorting, etc.) and ecological (current 
biomass size and individual species’ estimates, sustainable 
Figure 3 Maritime domain adaptive management model’s one year cycle 
Source: own representation
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carrying capacities, recruitment, growth rates, escape-
ment, harvest, total allowable catch, etc.) parameters. In 
practice, market based instruments have sometimes been 
proven to be relatively environmentally effective, econom-
ically efficient, in some cases achieving an environmental 
objective at relatively low cost. On the other hand, in the 
field of common resources, management nowadays is par-
ticularly a remarkable approach that includes inclusion 
of stakeholders in decision-making process about the re-
source and is based on self-governance. Such approach to 
shared resources management is trying to overcome im-
manent market imperfections through giving allocation 
authority to the stakeholders – users. In this paper we are 
investigating only the market based solutions of the fish-
ing concessions in Croatia to be in line with the actual EU 
policy in the sector. Since the markets are anonymous al-
locators, the ethical question of equity has also been bet-
ter addressed than a command and control system prone 
to constant political log-rolling. One of the ITQ’s other 
positive features is its ability to raise the incomes of the 
participants. ITQ’s are assets that have previously not 
existed. With their introduction, ITQ owners are able to 
make long term investment plans in boats and fishing 
gear. The ITQ’s are also a form of entry barrier, giving ad-
ditional protection to incumbent fishers. The purpose of 
this paper is to present the benefits of the introduction of 
property rights based incentives and market-based instru-
ments over prescriptive command and control regulation 
for Croatian fisheries. This policy has to include complete 
Croatian sovereignty over the internal and territorial wa-
ters as over the EEZ and its resources, the quantification 
and commodification of the resources, and allocation in 
form of Transferable Fishing Concessions, i.e. Individual 
Transferable Quotas.
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